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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KENNY JIM SHAW,

!

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

vs.

;

LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
STEEL DECK ERECTORS, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
JOHN DOES A to Z,

:
:
:
:
:

Defendants/Appellees.

:

CASE NUMBER: 930475-CA

LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, :
INC.,
:
Third-party Plaintiff, :
vs.

:

BILT-RITE CONCRETE, INC., a
Nevada corporation; I.
CHRISTENSEN INC., a Nevada
corporation or partnership;
HARV & HIGHAM MASONRY,
a Utah corporation; and TECH
STEEL, a Utah corporation,

:
:
:
:
:

Third-party Defendants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, JUDGE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah
Constitution; Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(k), 1953 as amended;

2

and, Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a

matter of law, that Nevada Workers Compensation law applies to this
case and that Defendants are exempt from common law liability for
injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.
2.

Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a

matter of law, that Plaintiff is not entitled to bring this action
for personal injuries pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended.
3.

Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a

matter of law, that Utah's Workers Compensation Act does not have
extraterritorial effect and that Plaintiff is prohibited from
bringing a personal injury claim against the named Defendants for
injuries sustained by the Plaintiff.
4.

Whether the trial court committed error in ruling, as a

matter of law, that the choice of law doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti
applies to workers' compensation cases where a Utah resident is
injured while temporarily working in another state.
5.

Whether the law of a foreign state should be applied in

workers' compensation cases where a Utah resident is injured while
temporarily working in another state and brings a third party
action in Utah.
6. Whether the law of the state paying workers' compensation

1
benefits should be applied in cases where a resident of the State
of Utah, receiving said benefits in Utah, brings a third party
action in Utah.
The standard of review for all issues of law presented on
appeal herein is one of assessment for correctness.

State v. Rio

Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1342 (Utah, 1990).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Plaintiff submits the following Constitutional and Statutory
provisions which are determinative of the issues presented for
appeal herein:
1.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, Section 1:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

2.

Utah Const, art. I, Section 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.

3.

Utah Const, art. I, Section 11:
"All courts shall be open and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to

1
which he is a party,
4. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended:
See Addendum "A".
5.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-54, 1953 as amended:

See Addendum "B".
6. Nevada Restatement Statutes, §616.270: See Addendum "C".
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Plaintiff/Appellant, Shaw, will sometimes be referred to
as "Shaw"; and the Defendant/Appellee, Layton Construction Company,
Inc., a Utah corporation, will

sometimes be referred

to as

"Layton"; the Defendant/Appellee, Steel Deck Erectors, Inc., a Utah
corporation, will sometimes be referred to as "Steel Deck".
"R." refers to Record; and "Ex." refers to Exhibit.
No record of the proceedings in the trial court was made or
transcribed

and therefore no reference will be made to the

transcript of record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A) Nature of the Case:
This is an action brought pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended, arising from
personal injuries sustained by Shaw while working on a construction
project in the State of Nevada on February 5, 1990. The Plaintiff,
his employer and the Appellees were, at all times relevant hereto,
residents of the State of Utah and Shaw was hired in the State of
Utah (R.3 7 7).

Further, the subcontracts between Layton, Shawf s

employer and the other Defendants were executed in Salt Lake City,
Utah in 1989.

Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for

personal injuries he received as a result of the negligence of the
named Defendants (R. 2-7; 12-18).
B) Course of Proceedings:
This is an Appeal from final Orders of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge, dated November
26, 1991 granting Layton's Motion to Dismiss and Steel Deck!s
Motion for Summary Judgment which were docketed with the Clerk of
the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or about
the same said date, and from all Rulings and Orders of said Court
affecting or pertaining to the rights claimed and asserted by the
Plaintiff. (R. 321-325; 326-329).
Defendants Layton and Steel Deck are the only Defendants who
have been served and who have entered an appearance in this matter.
Defendant, Bilt-Rite Concrete, Inc. (named in the Complaint as
Built-Right Concrete, Inc.) is believed to be a Nevada corporation
and has not been served in this matter.

However, it has been

served and entered an appearance as a third-party Defendant in the
underlying

third-party

action

brought

by

Layton

against

the

subcontractors involved. (R. 39-76; 86-87A; 105-110).
C) Disposition in Lower Court:
Hearing on Layton's Motion to Dismiss and Steel Deck's
Motion for Summary Judgment was held before the Honorable Pat B.

Brian, Third District Court Judge, on November 8, 1991.

Prior to

the hearing, Layton and Steel Deck submitted memoranda in support
of

their

respective

motions,

Shaw

opposition to each of the motions.
argument

and

thereafter

memoranda

in

The Court permitted oral

the parties1

took

arguments under advisement.

submitted

written

and

oral

Thereafter, the Court issued its

Memorandum Decision, containing its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and its Order dated November 26, 1991 granting both Motions
and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 110-120A; 121-138; 139149; 165-174; 193-194; 195-237; 242-254; 256-272; 321-329).
This case was previously on appeal before this Court pursuant
to a Notice of Appeal which was filed on December 26, 1991 (R.345346).

Inasmuch as this case also involves a third party Complaint

by Layton against other third party Defendants, this Court, on its
own Motion, dismissed

that appeal on the grounds that this

Plaintiff/Appellant did not obtain certification of the orders of
dismissal as final judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Accordingly, said appeal (case number 920685-CA)
was dismissed without prejudice.
Pursuant

to Motion

and

Stipulation, the parties

hereto

obtained a certification from the Trial Court as required by Rule
54(b) dated July 8, 1993.

A Notice of Appeal was filed by the

Plaintiff with the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah on July 20, 1993.

The matter is now

before this Court for consideration of the issues raised by the

1
Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about February 5, 1990, the Plaintiff, Shaw, was injured
while working on Phase II of the Maximum Security Prison in Ely,
Nevada.

Shaw, at all times relevant hereto, was and is a resident

of the State of Utah and at the time of his injury was employed by
Harv

& Higham

Masonry, a Utah

corporation

and

one

of

the

subcontractors on the project at the time of Shaw's injury (R.322323).

Shaw was first employed by Harv & Higham in May, 1989 in

Utah.

(R. 2-7; 374) (See Kenny Shaw Deposition, page 17, line 18).

At the time of his injury, Shaw had been in Ely, Nevada since about
November, 1989.

(R.377) (See Kenny Jim Shaw Deposition, page 20,

lines 6-14).
Layton is a Utah corporation and was the general contractor on
the prison project.

Steel Deck, also a Utah corporation, was one

of the subcontractors on the project.

All of the subcontracts

relevant to this action were executed and entered into in Salt Lake
City, Utah in or about July, 1989 (R. 44-56).
Subsequent to his injury, Shaw applied for and received
workers1 compensation benefits from the Workers Compensation Fund
of

Utah

and

entered

into

a

Compensation

Agreement

for his

permanent/partial disability which was approved by the Industrial
Commission of Utah.
Shaw filed this action pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended, (Addendum "A") to

recover

damages

from

negligent

third

parties

including

the

Defendants herein. (R.2-7; 12-18).
Defendant, Layton, filed a Motion to Dismiss and Defendant,
Steel Deck, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Both parties

contended that Shaw's only remedy was that granted to him by
Nevada's workers' compensation laws and that pursuant to those
laws, he

was

barred

from bringing

any third

party

action.

Defendants asserted the doctrine of lex loci delicti applies to
workers' compensation cases where a Utah resident is injured while
temporarily working in another state for a Utah employer and that
he is prohibited from bringing a third party action in Utah.
In opposition to the Defendants' Motions, Shaw asserted that
the Utah Legislature intended to give extraterritorial effect to
Utah's Workmens Compensation Act including Shaw's right to bring a
third party action under Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953
as

amended.

Shaw

contended

that

this

right

is

especially

applicable where the tortfeasors were Utah residents and where he
was hired

in Utah by a Utah employer and received workers'

compensation benefits in Utah.
On November 8, 1991, a hearing on Defendants' Motions was held
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. After taking the
parties' written and oral arguments under advisement, the trial
court granted both motions, ruling as a matter of law that Nevada's
workers'

compensation

laws apply to this case and that the

9_

Defendants were immune and exempt from liability

for Shaw's

injuries. The trial court further ruled that Shaw was not entitled
to bring this action under Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62, 1953 as
amended,

and

that

Utah's

Workmens

Compensation

Act

has

no

extraterritorial effect. (R. 321-325; 326-329).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue before this Court is whether Utah's workers'
compensation law should be applied in allowing Shaw to pursue a
third party action against the Defendants for injuries he sustained
while temporarily working in Nevada for his Utah employer.

While

Utah's Workmens Compensation Act allows such suits, Nevada's
workers' compensation law does not (Addendum "C").

This is not a

contract or tort law choice of law issue, but rather a workers'
compensation choice of law matter which is different due to certain
governmental interests and the public policy of this state.
As it pertains to third party actions arising from within the
workers' compensation context, Plaintiff contends that the workers'
compensation laws of Utah should be applied in allowing such
actions where certain factors are present.

Namely, where the

residence of the Plaintiff, his employer and the Defendants is in
Utah; where Plaintiff was hired in Utah; and where the Plaintiff
applied for and received workers' compensation benefits in Utah.
It is clear and unmistakable that the Utah Legislature and
this Court have stated that the public policy of this state is to
provide for a right of action on behalf of an injured employee
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against a third party tortfeasor.

Further, this right should be

extended to Utah residents who are hired in Utah by a Utah employer
and who are injured while temporarily working in another state.
This right is clearly established by the extraterritoriality of
Utah's Workmens Compensation Act as enunciated by this Court and
our Legislature.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH'S WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT GOVERNS RIGHT OF
UTAH RESIDENT TO BRING THIRD PARTY ACTION FOR
INJURIES SUSTAINED WHILE TEMPORARILY WORKING
IN ANOTHER STATE WHERE UTAH RESIDENT WAS
HIRED AND RECEIVED WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS IN UTAH
The principal issue which is before this Court is essentially
one involving a choice of laws.

It is an issue which has not

heretofore been settled by this Court and one which merits
attention as it bears upon the substitive rights of this state's
residents who are hired by a Utah employer and are injured on the
job while temporarily in another state.
resident

of

this

State who

is hired

Specifically, can a
here

and

required

to

temporarily work in another state, sue negligent third parties who
cause injury to him?

It is not an issue of which state's contract

or tort law applies, but rather which state's workers' compensation
law applies because an individual's right to bring a third party
action

exclusively

derives

from

the

applicable

workers'

compensation law, i.e., Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62, 1953 as

11
amended.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court was in complete

error in ruling that the tort doctrine of lex loci delicti applies
in workmens compensation cases such as this and that Nevada law,
which

bars

such

actions, applies.

Furthermore,

the

legal

authorities which the Defendants submitted to the trial court in
support of their arguments didn't involve or address this specific
issue.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the trial

court's ruling dismissing this case.
While this Court has not addressed this specific issue, the
Plaintiff

directs

the

Court's

attention

to

numerous

other

jurisdictions, both state and federal, which clearly hold that the
worker's compensation law of the state where the employee resides,
where he was hired, and where he received workmens compensation
benefits, determines his right to bring a third party action for
injuries sustained in the course of employment while temporarily in
another state. In Simaitis v. Flood, 437 A.2d 828 (Conn. 1980) an
injured

employee brought an action in Connecticut against a

coemployee based upon the negligent operation of an automobile
while they were in the state of Tennessee. Both the Plaintiff and
Defendant were residents of Connecticut; they were hired in
Connecticut, and their principal place of employment was in
Connecticut.

Each received workers' compensation benefits under

Connecticut law for injuries sustained in Tennessee. Tennessee law
did not allow an employee to sue a coemployee for injuries, and
Connecticut's workers' compensation law did permit such suits.

12.
By way of comparison to the case at hand, Plaintiff points out
that he and the Defendants are residents of Utah; Shaw was hired in
Utah and his principal place of employment is in Utah (R. 374, 377)
as are the Defendants1 principal places of business. Shaw applied
for and received workers1 compensation benefits in Utah for the
injuries he sustained in Nevada.

Nevada law does not allow suits

against negligent third parties. Utah allows such suits pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62, 1953 as
amended, and the cases of Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 777 P.2d
428 (Utah, 1989), and Bosch v. Busch Development, Inc., 777 P.2d
431 (Utah, 1989).
In Simaitis, supra, the Connecticut Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of which state's workers1 compensation law should be
applied in determining whether a third party action would be
allowed.

It first addressed then rejected the contract choice of

law rule. Id. at 831. Next, it discussed the tort choice of law
rule requiring application of the law of the state where the injury
occurred which is more commonly known as the rule of lex loci
delicti being asserted by the Defendants in the present case. The
Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the application of lex loci
delicti in workers1 compensation cases stating that:
"The place-of-the-injury rule affords only an
unsatisfactory resolution to the workers'
compensation choice of laws problem.ff Id. at
831 (emphasis added)
The Court continued:
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The application of Connecticutfs tort choice
of law principles to compensation cases would
bestow upon temporary visitors injured in
Connecticut
all
the
relief
which
the
Connecticut compensation act affords, but deny
that same relief to Connecticut residents
injured while on temporary business outside
the state, even when all of the incidents of
employment such as in this case, are in
Connecticut. Moreover, if this court were to
adhere to strict application of the place-ofthe-injury rule, a Connecticut resident and
employee of a Connecticut employer under a
Connecticut contract, who was injured while on
temporary business in another jurisdiction
might be left with no tort remedy whatsoever
if that other jurisdiction applied a different
choice of law rule. id. at 831
The Court then went on to adopt and hold that there is a
separate workers1 compensation Choice of Law standard which should
be applied in this type of case.

It held that:

"Connecticut's interest in compensating the
injured employee, a Connecticut resident to
the fullest extent possible is clear and
legitimate. Connecticut's other articulable
interest lies in permitting the Plaintiff's
employer, a Connecticut corporation, to
recover from the Defendant the amount of
compensation already paid or to be paid in the
future..." Id. at 832.
The Court then cited Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Company,
448 U.S. 261, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980) and said:

Just as Virginia had no legitimate interest in
preventing the District of Columbia from
awarding relief supplemental to that awarded
in Virginia, Tennessee has no legitimate
interest in preventing Connecticut from
providing the injured employee with a right of
action for damages against a third party,
particularly where both the employee and the
alleged tortfeasor are Connecticut residents,
the employer is a Connecticut corporation and

1!
the employee was hired and principally
employed in Connecticut. Simaitis, supra, at
832.
In its conclusion, the Court in Simaitis then held that
"the applicable law in a workers' compensation
case is the law of the place of the employment
relation, because the existence of the
employer-employee relation within the state
gives the state an interest in controlling the
incidents of that relation, one of which
incidents is the right to receive and the
obligation to pay compensation" Id. at 833.
(emphasis added)
Plaintiff here urges this Court to adopt the same Choice of
Law standard in workers' compensation cases such as this for the
same reasons enunciated by the Connecticut Supreme Court and the
authorities cited hereafter.

As in Simaitis, Utah clearly has an

interest in compensating a Utah resident who is injured while
temporarily working in another

state, to the fullest extent

possible. Likewise, Utah's interest also lies in permitting Shaw's
employer, a Utah corporation and the workers' compensation carrier,
to recover from the Defendants those amounts of compensation paid
as is permitted under Utah Code Annotated, §35-1-62.
The workers' compensation law of the State of Utah, which
allows third party actions, should be applied because Shaw and his
employer are Utah residents; Shaw was hired in Utah; Shaw received
workers' compensation benefits in Utah; the Defendants are also
Utah residents; Shaw's presence in Nevada was only temporary and
was an incident of his employment

(R. 322-323).

To bar any

recovery for Shaw against third parties would run contrary to the
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holding of the United States Supreme Court in the Thomas case,
cited supra in that Nevada has no legitimate interest in preventing
Utah from providing Shaw with a right of action for damages against
a third party, especially where the parties involved are Utah
residents and Shaw was hired in Utah by a Utah corporation and Shaw
is principally employed in Utah,
Connecticut is not alone in holding that there is a distinct
Choice of Law standard involving workers1 compensation cases which
doesn't recognize the tort standard of lex loci delicti.
In Braxton v. Anco Electric Co., 397 S.E.2d 640 (N.C.App.
1990) the North Carolina Court of Appeals dealt with a case which
is squarely on point with the one now before this Court.

In

Braxton, a North Carolina resident was employed by a plumbing
subcontractor, a North Carolina corporation, to work on a shopping
center in Virginia.

The general contractor and the electrical

subcontractor, Anco, named as defendant, were also North Carolina
corporations. Braxton was injured in an electrical explosion. He
applied for and received workers1 compensation benefits in North
Carolina.

He also filed a civil action in North Carolina against

Anco alleging negligence of Anco's employees in causing his
injuries. Anco sought and obtained a dismissal on the grounds that
the action was barred by Virginia's Worker's Compensation Act which
prohibits such actions.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and
held that even though the principle of lex loci applies in standard
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tort cases, it does not apply in third party workers1 compensation
cases due to certain governmental interests and public policy of
North Carolina. The Court stated: "North Carolina is the place of
Plaintiff's residence, the location of Defendant's business, and
the place of initial hiring."
Carolina's

workers'

Id. at 643.

compensation

law

It held that North

should

be

applied

in

permitting the third party suit because North Carolina's public
policy is "to provide for a right of action on behalf of an injured
employee against a third party tortfeasor

(even if a fellow

subcontractor) and even though the injured employee applied for and
received workers' compensation benefits." id. at 643.
Utah Code Annotated §35-1-62, and this Court's decisions in
Marathon Steel and Bosch clearly establish this state's public
policy to provide the same relief to an injured Utah employee
against a third party tortfeasor as does North Carolina and the
other jurisdictions cited herein.
In Hauch v. Connor, 453 A. 2d 1207 (Md. 1983) the Maryland
Court of Appeals recognized and adopted the same Choice of Law
standard set forth in Simaitis and Braxton. In discussing the rule
of lex loci delicti, that Court said:

"Here we are concerned not

with differences between Maryland and Delaware tort law, but with
differences in the workmen's compensation law of the two states.''
Id. at 1210 (emphasis added).

The Court continued:

Today, however, many courts recognize that
workmen's compensation law conflict issues
present distinct policy questions and should
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not be treated as tort or contract matters for
choice of law purposes. We agree with this
approach. Id. at 1211
The Maryland Court held that even though the injury in
question didn't occur in Maryland, there were "greater Maryland
issues" involved, and that Maryland workers1 compensation law
should determine the threshold question of the right to bring suit
in Maryland courts.

Id. at 1214.

In Saharceski v. Marcure, 366 N.E.2d 1245, (Mass. 1977), the
Massachusetts

Supreme

Court

faced

with

the

identical

issue

concluded that the workers1 compensation laws of the state of
employment determines whether a third party tort action may be
brought. In Saharceski, Massachusetts law barred third party suits
and the Court held that a Massachusetts resident injured in
Connecticut could not recover.

The Court determined that the

reasonable expectations of the parties was significant and that
reference to the place of common employment provides both a certain
source for resolution of the issue and the "assurance that the
ability to maintain a tort action will not turn solely on the
fortuitous circumstance of where the accident takes place." Id. at
1249 (citing Wilson v. Faull, 141 A.2d 768 {NJ 1958}).
In the present case, there is a clear conflict between
Nevada's workers' compensation laws and Utah's.

Nevada's law

prohibits third party actions of this type while Utah's does not.
As was argued to the trial court by this Plaintiff, this is not a
common law tort action governed by the common law doctrine of lex
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loci delicti. The cited authorities clearly agree. This cause of
action is granted by statute and a different Choice of Laws issue
arises.

The State of Utah has a clear interest in overseeing and

regulating the rights of its residents who are hired in Utah by a
Utah employer and who are injured while temporarily outside of this
state.
To now prohibit Shaw and other Utah residents in the same
position from pursuing this type of action based solely on the
"fortuitous circumstance" of where the injury occurred is clearly
against the policies established by our Legislature and this Court
and

is

repugnant

to

compensation statutes.

the

underlying

goals

of

our workers1

Without any question, had the injury

occurred in Utah, Shaw would be allowed to proceed against the
Defendants involved herein. However, the Defendants and the trial
court feel that because Shaw was in Nevada when the injury occurred
he should now be barred from pursuing the remedies available to him
from the state where he was hired and where he received his
workers' compensation benefits. This clearly runs contrary to the
reasonable expectations of Shaw and anyone in his position that he
will be protected by the workmens compensation laws of this state
should they be required to work temporarily in another state.
In Quiles v. Heflin Steel Supply Company, 699 P.2d 1304 (Ariz.
App. 1985), the Arizona Court of Appeals dealt with this same
issue.

In that case, a California resident, who was hired in

California by a California employer, was injured in the course of
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See also,
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Miller v. Yellow Cab Co., 31 N.E.2d 406 (111. 1941).
In Ouiles, the Court further held that "workers1 compensation
rights are substantive not merely procedural and therefore, once
the worker has exercised his choice of where to seek compensation
the compensation scheme of that state shall apply."

Supra. at

1309, See also. Restatement Second Conflict of Laws, §§6, 145 and
181-185 (1971).
In this case, a claim was filed in Utah with the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah and Shaw received compensation benefits
in Utah.

At no time did any of the Defendants protest Shaw's

receiving benefits here nor have they disputed his rights to
receive such benefits here. According to the ruling in Ouiles, the
"compensation scheme" of Utah should apply and that includes the
provision allowing third party actions under Utah Code Annotated,
§35-1-62.
Time and time again, the standard set forth in this type of
case is not the traditional lex loci delicti standard for a common
law tort action. This is due to the fact that this type of case is
not a traditional common law tort action.

Although the claim is

against third parties for negligence, it is different in that it is
a claim which is created by statute based on certain public policy
considerations enunciated by the Legislature and this Court.
Second, this type of case is different in that the Plaintiff's
presence in the other state is a direct result of an employment
contract entered into in Utah and Plaintiff is required to go to
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the other state as a condition of his employment.

It is not a

situation where someone who is just passing through or vacationing
in another
negligence.

state is injured as a result of

someone

else's

Such an occurrence has no connection to Utah's

workers1 compensation laws and the policies contained therein.
The prevailing rule clearly states that an employee, who is
hired in one state, and who is injured in the course of his
employment while temporarily working in another state is entitled
to the benefits under the workers1 compensation law of the state
where he is employed, including the right to bring a third party
action if the workers' compensation laws of the state of employment
so allows-

Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1985),

O'Connor v. Lee-Hv Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2nd Cir. 1978),
certiorari denied, Gillespie v. Schwartz, 493 U.S. 1034, 99 S.Ct.
638, 58 L.Ed.2d 696, Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 F.Supp. 871
(D.C.N.Y. 1983), Fox v. Sharlow, 579 A.2d 603 (Conn. Super. 1990),
Fagan v. John J. Casale, Inc., 16 Misc.2d 1046, 184 N.Y.S.2d 109
(1959).
The Plaintiff urges this Court to adopt this rule and hold
that the provisions of Utah's workers' compensation laws should be
applied in allowing Shaw to maintain a third party action against
negligent tortfeasors for injuries he sustained while temporarily
working in the state of Nevada.

It is obvious and clear that the

State of Utah has a compelling and legitimate interest in applying
its own workers compensation laws based on employment relationships
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and contracts which are made within its boundaries by and between
its residents.

Although no constitutional issues were raised

before the trial court, the denial of Shaw's right to bring and
maintain this lawsuit may constitute a violation of the Equal
Protection provisions of both the United States and Utah State
Constitutions-

For example, it would be manifestly unjust and

discriminatory to allow one of Shaw's coemployees who is injured in
Utah to have more remedies than someone like Shaw who has to go out
of this state to work on a temporary basis. This would constitute
unequal treatment of two Utah residents who work for the same Utah
employer.

Also, it is clear that one of the policy reasons for

extending the protection of Utah's Workmens Compensation Act to
someone in Shaw's position is to prevent the loss of protection to
such an individual simply because his employer assigns him to go
outside of this state on a temporary basis to work.

Such an

employee

of

should

not

have

to

suffer

merely

because

the

"fortuitous circumstance" of where he may be injured.
POINT II
UTAH'S WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACT HAS EXTRATERRITORIAL
EFFECT PERMITTING AN INJURED UTAH RESIDENT TO BRING
A THIRD PARTY ACTION FOR INJURIES RECEIVED OUTSIDE
OF THE STATE
In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled, as a matter
of

law, that Utah's Workers Compensation

Act does not have

extraterritorial effect for injuries to a Utah worker injured in
another state and that Shaw is prohibited from bringing a personal
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injury claim against the Defendants herein (R. 321-325; 326-329).
The ruling is incorrect and contrary to the prevailing statutory
and case law.

In United Air lines Transport Corp. v. Industrial

Commission, 151 P.2d 591, 596, 107 Utah 52 (Utah 1944) the Utah
Supreme Court addressed this issue recognizing that Utah's Workmens
Compensation Act had extraterritorial effect. In deciding whether
to exercise jurisdiction and apply Utah law where a Utah worker is
injured outside of this state, the Court must first look at where
the contract of employment was entered into and the residency of
the parties to that contract.

In Allen v. Industrial Commission,

172 P.2d 669, 675 (Utah 1946) the Utah Supreme Court dealt with a
situation similar to that presented in this case.

In deciding

whether Utah's Workmens Compensation Act should apply where a Utah
resident was injured in another state, the Court stated:
The entering into a contract of employment
within the state between residents and
citizens thereof creates the relationship of
employer and employee, although the same is
not localized within this state, which is
sufficient to give this state jurisdiction to
regulate that relationship.
This state is
interested in providing this protection to its
residents and citizens. (emphasis added)
The underlying contract between Layton and Shaw's employer,
Harv & Higham Masonry, was entered into in Salt Lake City, Utah on
July 19, 1989. All of the parties involved, including Layton, Harv
&

Higham Masonry, and Shaw himself were and still are Utah

residents.

Consequently, the State of Utah has jurisdiction to

regulate that relationship and apply its workers' compensation laws

M
even though the injury occurred in another state. As stated in the
Allen case supra, the state of Utah has an interest in protecting
its citizens when they are hired in this state by another Utah
resident but injured in a foreign jurisdiction.
whether

a

workers1

compensation

act

should

In determining
be

applied

extraterritorially, the general rule is to look at the intention of
the legislature in the enactment of the statute.
Generally speaking, whether or not the
workmen's compensation act of the state where
the contract of employment was made extends to
injuries received outside the state depends
upon the intention of the legislature, and
such intention is to be ascertained in
accordance with the general rules of statutory
construction. There is very little difficulty
in applying the act of the state of employment
where the legislative intention so to apply it
is made manifest by the provision of the act.
99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §23(a).
In addition to the earlier cited cases which were decided by
this Court declaring that Utah's Workmens Compensation Act had
extraterritorial effect for injuries received by Utah residents
while temporarily outside of the state, Plaintiff directs the
Court's attention to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §35-154 which clearly states the Legislature's intention that the Act is
to be applied extraterritorially in situations such as the one now
before this Court.

§35-1-54 provides:

If an employee who has been hired or is
regularly employed in this state receives
personal injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of such employment outside of
this state, he, or his dependents in case of
his death, shall be entitled to compensation
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according to the law of this state.
This
provision shall apply only to those injuries
received by the employee within six months
after leaving the state, unless prior to the
expiration of such six months the employer has
filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah
notice that he has elected to extend such
coverage a greater period of time.
The

Defendants

extraterritorial

argued

in

the

trial

court

that

the

aspects of Utah's Workmens Compensation

Act

applied only to the right of the injured employee to receive
"compensation" and not his right to bring a third party action
under

§35-1-62.

Plaintiff submits that such an argument is

erroneous and runs contrary to the intent of our Legislature to
protect the interests and rights of residents of Utah who are
injured while temporarily in another state.

Further, based upon

the

contends

authorities

Legislature

cited

intended

herein,
that

Plaintiff

the

entire

Act

extraterritorially and not in a piecemeal fashion.

that

be

the

applied

This would

include the provisions of §35-1-62 permitting third party actions
against negligent tortfeasors.
Furthermore, it is this Plaintiff's position that unless the
Act specifically states otherwise, it is to have extraterritorial
effect in its entirety.

In State ex. rel. Lonev v. State

Industrial Accident Board, 286 P 408 (Mont. 1930) the Montana
Supreme Court held:
The weight of authority in this country
sustain the assertion that a Workmen's
Compensation Act will apply to injuries to
workmen employed in the state and injured

1&

while temporarily out of its limits, unless
there is something in the act making it
inapplicable or clearly denying the right of
the employee to recover in such case, id at
409.
In the context of the extraterritorial application of a
workers1 compensation act in a third party tort action, the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in discussing the Mississippi
workers1 compensation statute said:
Under
certain
conditions
an
employee,
regularly employed in one state, who is
injured in the course of his employment while
temporarily employed in another state, shall
be entitled to benefits under the workmen's
compensation law of the state where he is
regularly employed.
Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1182 (5th Cir. 1985),
rehearing denied 779 F.2d 682.
Under this standard, it is clear that since Shaw was employed
in the state of Utah, and more specifically was

"regularly

employed" in this state, he should be entitled to all of the
benefits under Utah's Workmens Compensation Act which would include
his right to bring a third party tort action against the Defendants
herein.
In the case of Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P. 2d 1363 (Wyo.
1988), the Wyoming Supreme Court was faced with an issue almost
identical to that now before this Court.

In that case, a Wyoming*

resident was killed while working for his Wyoming employer on a
temporary basis in the State of Colorado.

The employee's estate

filed a lawsuit against the employer, the employer's corporate
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grandparent and coemployees for wrongful death.

The Wyoming

Supreme Court held that Wyoming's workers1 compensation statute
applied to a worker while he was temporarily working in Colorado
and that the personal representative of the employee's estate was
entitled to maintain a culpable negligence suit against coemployees
although the injury occurred in Colorado.
The statute then before the Wyoming Court was §27-12-208(a),
W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement which provided:
If an employee, while working outside of the
territorial limits of this state, suffers an
injury on account of which he, or in the event
of his death, his dependents, would have been
entitled to the benefits provided by this act
{§§27-12-101 through 27-12-804} had the injury
occurred within this state, the employee, or
in the event of his death resulting from the
injury, his dependents, are entitled to the
benefits provided by this act, if at the time
of the injury:
(i) his employment is principally
located in this state;
(ii) he is working under a contract
of hire made in this state in
employment not principally localized
in any state; or
(iii) he is working under a contract
of hire made in this state in
employment principally localized in
another
state
whose
worker's
compensation law is not applicable
to his employer.
This statutory provision, as noted by the Wyoming Court, is
almost identical to the Model Worker's Compensation Act pertaining •
to extraterritorial coverage for employees while working on a
temporary basis in a state other than that where the employee was
hired.

Plaintiff points out that both the Wyoming statute and the
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Model Worker's Compensation Act merely state the employee or his
heirs are entitled to the benefits provided by the act.

These

statutes do not specifically state that the employee or his heirs
have a right to bring a third party action for injuries received
outside of the state. Nevertheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court in
this case relied upon the extraterritorial language of this statute
in holding that it extends to the right of the employee to bring
such a third party action.

Accordingly, any contention by the

Defendants that the extraterritorial provisions of the Utah Act
apply only to the employee's rights to receive "compensation" and
nothing else is erroneous and without any legal basis whatsoever.
The Defendants may contend that the terms "benefits" and
"compensation" have different meanings and that Utah's statute
should be more narrowly construed.

Plaintiff directs the Court's

attention to §35-1-44(6) which defines the term "compensation" as
follows:

"Compensation" shall mean the payments and benefits

provided for in this title" (emphasis added).

Just as in the

Wyoming Act and the Model Worker's Compensation Act, the term
"benefits" is used and it is apparent that this term can and should
be construed to mean all of the benefits allowed under the Workmens
Compensation Act including the right to bring a third party tort
action for injuries received by the employee while temporarily
outside of the state.
Nowhere in the Utah Act does it state that it is not to have
extraterritorial effect and as stated earlier, it is a generally
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accepted and well established principle that unless a workers1
compensation act expressly provides that it shall have no extraterritorial effect, it applies to workmen employed in a state to do
work outside of the territorial limits of that state.

Gooding v.

Ott, 87 S.E. 862 (W.Va.). The Utah Act contains no provision which
states that it should have no extraterritorial effect.

On the

contrary, §35-1-54 clearly states that it is to have such an effect
and that all of the benefits included in the entire act are to be
extended to Utah residents who are hired within this state and who
are injured while temporarily working outside of its boundaries.
And, as already set forth above, this includes the right granted
under §35-1-62 to sue negligent third parties who caused the
injuries to the employee while he was temporarily working outside
of the state.
CONCLUSION
As set forth above, the prevailing authority clearly states
that in the context of workers1 compensation cases, and third party
actions arising from injuries in a foreign jurisdiction, there is
a choice of law standard which is separate and apart from the lex
loci delicti standard used in common law tort cases which the
Defendants

are urging

should

be

applied.

For

various

and

legitimate policy reasons, the workers' compensation law of the
state where the Plaintiff resides, where he was employed, and where
he

received

his

workers1

compensation

benefits

applies

in

determining his right to bring a third party action, not the
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workers1 compensation laws of the state where he was injured.

Of

further relevance and importance is the residence of the employer
and the tortfeasors.

Essentially, every factor in this case is

directly associated with Utah and its workers' compensation laws.
Consequently,

the

extraterritoriality

of

Utah's

Workmens

Compensation Act and the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, §35-162 of the Act allowing third party suits, should be applied to this
case allowing this Plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit against
any and all negligent tortfeasors including the name Defendants
herein.
Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Orders of
the trial court granting Summary Judgment and Dismissal be reversed
and that this matter be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Resp^ctfullV Submitted,

DRY R</WALL
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM "A"
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-62, 1953 AS AMENDED

35-1-62

35-1-62.

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer — Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action — Maintenance of action — Notice of intention to proceed
against third party — Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer relationship —
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.

When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission.
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1).
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917,
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933,
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58;

L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 7G, § 3; 1973,
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3.
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ADDENDUM "B"
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-54, 1953 AS AMENDED

35-1-54

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

35-1-54. Employee injured outside state — Entitled to compensation — Limitation of time.
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state
receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such
employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in case of his death,
shall be entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. This
provision shall apply only to those injuries received by the employee within
six months after leaving this state, unless prior to the expiration of such six
months period the employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah
notice that he has elected to extend such coverage a greater period of time.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 65; C.L. 1917,
§ 3126; R.S. 1933, 42-1-52; L. 1941, ch. 37,
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-52.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Employees of foreign corporation.
Foreign compensation laws.
Injuries in interstate commerce.
Operation and effect.
Words and phrases defined.
Cited.
Employees of foreign corporation.
Since relation of employer and employee existed between foreign transportation company
and truck driver in this state at time of injury,
Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to
make award, and such power in nowise depended upon reading into his contract of employment the law of Colorado where the contract was made, for when employer sent his
employee into Utah to work for it there, it subjected itself to this chapter. Buckingham
Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah
342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937).
Employer or its insurance carrier are not required to make payments to injury benefit fund
where airline stewardess, employed in California by employer with its principal offices in
California, is killed in course of temporary employment in Utah leaving no surviving dependents. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752
(1946).
Foreign compensation laws.
In action by employee for personal injuries
arising in state of Wyoming, defense that Wyoming had adopted Workmen's Compensation
Act, and that such act furnished adequate and
exclusive remedy to employee to recover compensation, was sustained. Bozo v. Central Coal
& Coke Co., 54 Utah 289, 180 P. 432 (1919).
Resident employee who was injured in

course of employment in another state was entitled to compensation for such injuries, although employer was insured under laws of
other state. Pickering v. Industrial Comm'n, 59
Utah 35, 201 P. 1029 (1921).
In the absence of proof it will be presumed
that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of another state are the same as
those of the forum. Shurtliff v. Oregon Short
Line R.R., 66 Utah 161, 241 P. 1058 (1925).
Injuries in interstate commerce.
Industrial Commission had power to make
award under this section for injury to trucker
employed by foreign corporation under foreign
contract notwithstanding that trucker was in
interstate commerce when injured. Buckingham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93
Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937).
Operation and effect.
If employer-employee relationship is maintained in this state, Industrial Commission has
jurisdiction to make an award notwithstanding
that original contract of employment was entered into in foreign state and that injury occurred in foreign state. Fay v. Industrial
Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P.2d 508 (1941).
Commission had right to award compensation for death of salesman occurring in Idaho,
under first sentence of this section, notwithstanding that original contract of employment
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ADDENDUM "C"
NEVADA REVISED STATUTE, §616.270

616.270

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

616.270

616.270. Employers to provide compensation; relief from liability.
1. Every employer within the provisions of this chapter, and those
employers who shall accept the terms of this chapter and be governed by its
provisions, as in this chapter provided, shall provide and secure compensation
according to the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter for any and
all personal injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of and
in the course of the employment.
2. Travel for which an employee receives wages shall, for the purposes of
this chapter, be deemed in the course of employment.
3. In such cases the employer shall be relieved from other liability for
recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal injury, unless by
the terms of this chapter otherwise provided. (1947, p. 572; CL 1929 (1949
Supp.), § 2680.26; 1971, p. 2058.)
CASE NOTES
I.
II.
III.
IV.

General Consideration.
Injury Arising Out of and In Course of Employment.
Exclusivity of Act.
Provision of Coverage by Employer.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Cited in: Simon Serv. Inc. v. Mitchell, 73
Nev. 9. 307 P.2d 110 (1957); Tab Constr. Co. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 83 Nev. 364. 432
P.2d 90 (1967); Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas,
87 Nev. 201, 484 P 2d 572 (1971); Nevada
Indus. Comm'n v. Reese, 93 Nev. 115, 560 P.2d
1352 (1977); Spencer v. Harrah's Inc., 98 Nev.
99, 641 P.2d 481 (1982); Lewis v. United
States, 680 F 2d 68 (9th Cir. 1982).
II. INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.
Negligence of fellow employee. — When
an employee is injured on the job as a result of
the negligence of a fellow employee, his remedy is compensation under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. Leslie v. J.A. Tiberti
Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 494, 664 P.2d 963 (1983).
Assault while at work. — Where an employee is assaulted and injury is inflicted upon
him through animosity and ill will arising
from some cause wholly disconnected with the
employer's business or the employment, the
employee cannot recover compensation simply
because he is assaulted when he is in the
discharge of his duties. Under such circumstances, the injury does not arise out of the
course of employment, and the employment is
not the cause of the injury, although it may be
the occasion of the willful act and may furnish
the opportunity for its execution. McColl v.
Scherer, 73 Nev. 226, 315 P.2d 807 11957).

Assault by insane coemployee. — Employee's death, as a matter of law, arose out of
the employment, where he was assaulted in
the course of his employment by an insane
fellow employee. Cummings v. United Resort
Hotels, Inc., 85 Nev. 23, 449 P.2d 245 (1969).
Shooting of employee. — In a personal
injury action brought against a club owner by
a waitress who was shot by a customer while
on duty, summary judgment for the employer
on grounds that she was covered by the Industrial Insurance Act was improper, where there
was no determination as to whether her injury
resulted from being placed in a position of
danger by reason of her employment or was the
result of enmity, grudge, or other personal
relationship. McColl v. Scherer, 73 Nev. 226,
315 P.2d 807 (1957).
Recreational activity. — Recreational activity should not be deemed to be within the
course of employment unless it is a regular
incident of employment, or is required by the
employer, or is of direct benefit to the employer
beyond the intangible value of employee
health and morale common to all kinds of
recreation and social life; thus, where it was
not a regular incident of employee's employment to enjoy recreation on his day off at golf
driving range, and his employer did not require his presence there, nor did the employer
receive a direct benefit from that off-duty
activity beyond the intangible value of employee health and morale common to all kinds
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